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ABSTRACT 
For the last thirty years, port governance has been marked by a new level of complexity 
which has resulted in the reshaping of the system of actors involved in the organization of 
ports. Devolution, which is taking place on most of the world’s port ranges has thus altered 
the public-private division, i.e. the respective roles played by the different tiers of government 
and private operators in operation and regulation functions. There is an abundant literature 
on this topic, particularly in economics and management and the work of international 
organizations. This research has cast much light on the new modes of governance and is 
now attempting to explain how they are linked to port performance Models of port 
governance frequently consider the “public sector” to be a homogeneous entity and rather 
less research has examined its variety, i.e. the different categories of public sector actors 
that run the institutional levels that control the ports. The aim of this paper is thus to provide 
some insights into this question of the institutional geography of ports by identifying the 
various tiers of government, the functions they perform and how they are linked with each 
other in a number of ports. It draws on the main findings of research carried out for the 
French General Directorate for the Sea and Transport that aimed to shed light on public 
decision-making and the institutional models applied in port governance in 7 European 
countries and Canada. It therefore examines port statuses and legislation, supervision, 
monitoring, management and public finance in order to understand the diversity of the public 
sector presence in port models that are founded on different institutional geographies. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE VARIETY OF ROLES FOR THE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN PORT GOVERNANCE MODELS  
The changes in port policy that have occurred throughout the world in the last thirty years 
have considerably modified the way functions are distributed between the private and public 
sectors. A few general institutional and academic models sum up this change. These models 
explain the recent transition, that has occurred since the 1980s, from highly centralized port 
management performed exclusively by the public sector to joint management by the maritime 
and port industry and various levels of the public sector. The word “governance” illustrates 
this idea of a new complexity which results in the interweaving of the public and private 
sectors and a complex encounter between the different levels of port development, from local 
to global, to use the traditional expression. By modifying port management more or less all 
over the world, port policies have thus moved in step with the changes that have affected the 
maritime industry (containerization, specialization, the concentration of flows) and the 
strategies of actors in the transport sector (vertical and horizontal integration, privatization 
and internationalization, etc.). 
There is an abundant literature, particularly in economics and management on this topic. The 
research in question has shed much light on the new modes of governance, the distribution 
of the various functions of ports and is now attempting to explain the complex link between 
performance and governance. The links between the private and public sectors are central to 
these analyses. In this work the “public sector” is frequently considered to be a 
homogeneous entity and little research has addressed the different tiers of government and 
the various public sector actors present in the institutions that control the ports. The aim of 
this paper is thus to provide some insights into this question of the institutional geography of 
ports. After describing some of the major work that explains the changes that have occurred 
in port governance (Part 1), we shall present the principal results of a research project 
conducted for the French General Directorate for the Sea and Transport (Direction Générale 
de la Mer et des Transports) that investigated the diversity of the public sector and the 
institutional levels of port management in 7 European countries with a comparison with 
Canada (Part 2). This comparative approach will then allow us to identify some of the major 
features of the institutional geography of ports and how it may change, explaining the new 
role of the public sector in the management of the interfaces between the different levels of 
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1.PORT GOVERNANCE: AN ABUNDANCE OF ACADEMIC 
RESEARCH THAT SUPPLEMENTS THE MODELS DEVELOPED 
BY INSTITUTIONS. 
The success of the concept of governance is shown by the fact that it has been defined in a 
large number of ways in the context of institutional use and academic research. International 
institutions, the World Bank first and foremost, have given wide currency to this term which 
opened up the way for a new approach to political issues, in particular the relationship 
between the public and private spheres. This use has an obvious instrumental or even 
normative dimension (“good governance”) which makes it possible to recommend and justify 
certain political reforms. The academic world, in the disciplines of political science, 
management, institutional economics, sociology and geography, has also appropriated this 
word which made it possible to renew the theoretical apparatus in a changing institutional 
environment. We shall not attempt here to examine all the different approaches involved but 
will start from a point which is common to virtually all the definitions: the complex forms of 
interaction between actors belonging to different spheres (political, business, civil society). 
Behind the different definitions lies the recognition of the increased complexity of 
relationships when the actors and their level of action develop in an environment of 
globalization, regionalization and decentralization which modifies the traditional boundaries 
of political action.  
With regard to the question of ports, an increasing number of studies are dealing with the 
relationship between governance and the modes of port organization. It is true that the 
developments that have taken place in ports show to perfection the new type of relationships 
between the private and public sectors, i.e. the encounter between different levels of action 
and new ways of coordinating the varied interests which must come together to develop a 
common project (port organization). In an environment where the liberalization of service 
activities has become almost universal, and in an attempt to find capital that is able to meet 
the new needs of the maritime and port industry, legislators have accepted the transition 
from a model in which the port was almost completely public to new models which encourage 
the greater involvement of private sector operators in port governance. Of course, the 
changes have not been uniform and have not led to the dominance of a single organizational 
model that is applied everywhere regardless of national conditions. However, the move 
towards a market economy model underpins public policies on all port ranges and the 
investment needs arising from the concentration of flows in a smaller number of ports have 
encouraged the emergence of new forms of public-private partnership everywhere. 
When considering the relationship between the public and private sectors, the most 
frequently-used classification is that given by the World Bank in Module 3 of the “Port Reform 
Toolkit”, which has subsequently been modified and added to by a number of researchers. 
Four categories of port organization are identified according to whether it is the private or the 
public sector that dominates management of the infrastructures, the superstructures, 
operations and other services. The two extremes of this typology – service ports in which all 
the functions are performed by the private sector and private ports in which there is no public 
sector participation – characterize ports with very little sharing of responsibility between the 
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very dominant and private sector activity is limited to certain operations, in particular cargo 
handling on the quays, which is nevertheless performed using equipment owned by the 
public authority. The last category consists of the landlord port model in which the public 
authority merely owns the infrastructure and the land and leases them out to private 
operators in the framework of a port concession. In this category, the superstructure belongs 
to the private sector operator that runs to terminal under a contractual agreement with the 
port authority for a variable duration that in theory depends on the scale of the investments 
made by the private sector operator. 
This typology provides an imperfect but convenient way of looking at modes of port 
governance and allows us to classify the world’s ports. It has, above all, an obvious 
normative function, guiding port reforms. It is interesting, for example, to note that the recent 
reform of the Major French Seaports (Grands Ports Maritimes) in France referred explicitly to 
the landlord port model to justify the change in port statuses. The toolkit does not therefore 
just provide a classification but also recommends a refocusing of public sector involvement 
and greater private sector activity. Baird has concluded that this general model is applied in 
90% of the world’s largest container ports (Baird, 1999). These categories have been much 
added to, but the convenient definition of port organization based on the distinction between 
superstructure, infrastructure and operation has not been brought into question. The main 
shortcoming of this distinction is that it does not take account of regulation and ownership, 
despite the attention these frequently receive in academic studies. Baird also, still from the 
standpoint of the distinction between the public and private sectors, brings in the concept of 
port regulator in order to explain the different possible modes of port governance (Baird, 
2000). Regulation, ownership and operation thus represent a more sophisticated way of 
analyzing the functions of ports and the actors involved. The work of Baltazar & Brooks 
(2001) added substantially to this analysis framework, identifying in greater detail the various 
regulator and port operation functions by considering the division between the public and 
private sectors from a functional perspective This work, which has subsequently been 
extended, identified varied port profiles on the basis of a port devolution matrix (Brooks, 2004 
& 2007). 
Other approaches have made the question of ownership central to the definition of port 
regimes. This means that in order to define a port organization it is first of all necessary to be 
aware of ownership rights in the ports. For Gouvernal and Lotter (2001) for example, the 
above categories may be defined on the basis of the ownership and use of assets, that is to 
say by who owns the land, who owns the infrastructure and who owns the equipment as 
much as by who provides the services. A “service port” is therefore defined by the fact that a 
port authority (which may be private or public) owns and manages all the assets and 
provides all the port’s services (a “tool port” cannot provide all the services that can be 
provided by private sector while retaining the public ownership of assets). In addition, the 
landlord port model is founded on a distinction between the ownership of the land and the 
infrastructure (public) and the ownership of the equipment and the provision of services 
(private). 
It is, of course, necessary to add to this initial brief survey of the literature. A large body of 
research has shed light on the rapid changes that have affected port organization modes, in 
the context, in particular, of the development of containerization, by analyzing the changes 
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infrastructure and superstructures that provide port services
1. Thus, a wide range of studies 
have analyzed the challenges posed to port authorities by the changes that are affecting the 
transport and logistics sector (Comtois & Slack, 2003; Notteboom & Winkemans, 2001), and 
other studies have attempted to explain the political processes responsible for the changes in 
port governance, be they various forms of devolution (Brooks, 2007) or simply privatization 
(Cullinane & Song & Cullinane, 2002, Baird, 1995). More generally, maritime researchers 
have given much attention to new types of private-public relationship, analyzing the changes 
that are apparent along the port ranges of Asia (Wang & Olivier, 2004), North America (Ircha, 
1997, Brooks, 2007, Slack., 1993), Europe (Heaver et al., 2001, Meersmann et al, 2007, De 
Langen et al., 2007…), but also in different environments such as Australia (Everett & 
Robinson, 1998) or Latin America (Hoffmann, 2001). In addition, more recently, a new 
research direction seems to be developing that examines the link between these types of 
governance and port performance. One recent paper (Brooks & Pallis, 2008) has measured 
port performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness and related it directly to the type of 
port organization. It employs a conceptual framework that takes account of the different 
components of port performance with a view to providing a tool for evaluating and improving 
existing port governance models. 
This brief survey is obviously not exhaustive. It nevertheless allows us to show the wealth of 
research in the area of port governance. Despite the variety of the approaches, it all 
observes change on the basis of a threefold division between infrastructure and 
superstructure, regulation and operation and public and private sector actors. The distinction 
between the operator function and the regulator function frequently allows us to understand 
the division of tasks between private operators and the public sector, although admittedly this 
association between the private sector and operation does not involve all port services and 
only relates to market services. A number of functions, in particular with regard to policing, 
security, customs, and environmental protection are mostly performed by the public sector, 
and frequently by central government. More broadly, the distinction between market and non-
market services, to use the terminology of the European Union, often provides the boundary 
between private and public sector action. It should also be added that public action is 
characterized by a number of different levels. The highest level of port governance consists 
of the legal framework which is subject to the Executive and the institutions of the various 
tiers of government (municipal, regional, national). In all parts of the world, the legal status of 
ports is first of all defined by the legislator, usually central government. Even the completely 
private status of British ports was granted by the legislative authority (central government). 
Below this level, there is more variety as regards the body to which the port authority 
answers. There is a variety of arrangements that run from a central government agency to 
regional or even municipal supervisory authorities and it is not possible to identify any 
relationship between the size of the port and the level from which it is supervised. The 
interaction between these political bodies and the port authority is obviously the central 
aspect of port governance. The degree of autonomy granted to the authority that manages 
the port with respect to the supervisory authority determines the port authority’s scope of 
action.  
                                                 
1 The recent collective publication "Devolution, Port Governance and Port Performance" (under the direction de 
Brooks & Cullinane) points up a wide range of theoretical research into theses issues, which has then been 
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Research into port governance has until now paid less attention to the complex nature of 
public sector involvement, i.e. the different institutional levels and the interaction between 
them. After a detailed examination of the new types of relationships between the public and 
private sectors and the links between these and port performance, a new area of research 
seems to be emerging that deals with the public sector and its different forms. In this context, 
special mention should be given to the work of Wang and Olivier (2004). Their analysis of the 
changes in the governance of Chinese ports is based on a three-axis conceptual framework: 
spatial-jurisdictional scales (axis 1), the stakeholder community (axis 2), and logistical 
capabilities (axis 3). The first axis represents the redistribution of public power between the 
different levels of port management (local, provincial, national). The authors thus show the 
new distribution of institutional responsibilities between the Ministry of Communications, 
provincial and municipal governments and port administrations that has taken place since the 
Port Law of the People’s Republic of China was introduced. This geographical approach to 
institutional levels equally explains the recent transition to competition between ports which 
also becomes competition between port cities and port terminals. The institutional geography 




2. INSTITUTIONAL LEVELS, ACTORS AND DECISIONS: THE 
DIVERSITY OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR.  
 
The different modes of port organization in Europe and Canada allow us to perceive the 
diversity of public sector involvement in port governance. The observations that follow are 
based on research carried out for the French General Directorate for the Sea and Transport
2. 
This work set out to provide insights that would be useful for the reform of French ports by 
comparing the main features of port organization in 7 European countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom) and Canada. The study was 
based on an examination of the texts and laws that apply to ports, a consideration of the 
institutional relationships within international organizations and the Ministries of each country 
with regard to the issue of port reform, an examination of the academic literature mentioned 
in Part 1, and a number of interviews in Europe and Canada. This paper does not set out to 
provide a detailed explanation of the situation in each of the studied countries
3 but rather to 
identify the main elements that reveal the institutional geography of ports.  
 
European ports 
                                                 
2 Debrie J & Ruby C. (2009) Approche des réformes portuaires européennes et nord américaines (Canada). 
Eléments de réflexion pour la politique portuaire française. An overview study conducted in the framework of the 
core studies of the Direction Générale de la Mer et des Transports / Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du 
Développement Durable et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (France), 50 p.  
3 This overview study that provides a picture of the situations in different countries is in the public domain and 
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From the institutional point of view, this analysis of the situation in seven European countries 
shows very clearly the absence of a European model in the areas of port status, the legal 
status of port authorities, the level of port supervision, national legislation and port autonomy. 
The most important aspects to point out are the differences in the status of ports and the 
status of the port authorities. The public supervisory bodies for the major European ports 
may be municipal, regional, joint or national. At a European level it is also difficult to 
construct a typology in order to sort ports into different categories. The major German ports 
(Hamburg, Bremen-Bremerhaven) are thus under the joint supervision of municipalities and 
regions (Lander) which is not at all comparable with the situation in the major ports in the 
Netherlands (Rotterdam, Amsterdam) or Belgium (Antwerp, Ghent) whose main supervisory 
authority is municipal. In this case, therefore it is mainly the amount of autonomy a port 
authority has in relation to its supervisory authority which allows us to identify the port model. 
It is nevertheless obviously the case that in the three countries in the North of Europe 
(Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands) the municipal levels of government play a remarkably 
important role in comparison with the other European countries (France, Spain, Italy) which 
are characterized by national supervision, by which we mean that central government in all 
cases plays an important role in controlling the organization of ports with municipalities 
playing a very secondary role in governance systems. This diversity of statuses is even more 
marked when we consider the legal status of the port authorities. In fact, all the possible 
situations as regards the status of a port authority are present in each country. Although, 
except in the United Kingdom, there has not been a policy of privatization, and although ports 
are still largely public, European ports display highly varied profiles. They sometimes consist 
of classical public corporations (the major French, Spanish and Italian ports), sometimes 
autonomous municipal corporations or private companies with public capital (the major 
Belgian, Dutch and German ports), and more rarely private companies with private capital 
(the majority of UK ports). 
The next factor that differentiates the institutional composition of European ports is the 
general legislative dimension. The modes of port organization are thus defined either by what 
one could term a national framework law which lays down imposed changes (law number 
84/94 in Italy, law number 2008-660 on port reform in France, law 48/2003 of 26 November 
for Spanish ports of general interest), or, in the other European countries, defined by a 
specific arrangement for each port that is built up gradually in agreement with the existing 
jurisdictions (employment law, environmental legislation) but without any legal framework 
that imposes the mode of port organization.  
These differences in statuses, supervisory authorities and national legislation mean that 
there is no such thing as a European model. However, an analysis of the seven countries 
allows us to identify easily some common features which describe a general pattern of 
institutional change in ports. The division between operational activities and regulatory 
activities which provides the basis for the division of functions between the private and public 
sectors is clearly apparent in the modes of organization of European ports. The distribution of 
roles seems not only to be determined by differences in status but also by the separation 
between infrastructure and superstructure. This is of course the case with regard to port 
functions, but it also applies to finance. While infrastructure remains predominantly financed 
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privately financed. In the case of container terminal development projects, this division of 
investment has become the general rule in all major European ports. This way of funding 
infrastructure depends on contributions from all the levels of the public sector, from the 
municipal to the European level. More generally, port access, the locks, the terminal 
infrastructure, and dredging etc. are paid for by the public sector in a way that has been more 
or less fixed. In connection with this last point, we can observe the familiar clear, quantified 
and fulfilled commitment on the part of the public authorities that finance the German, 
Belgian and Dutch ports. So, while the public sector has withdrawn from operating and 
financing superstructures, it nevertheless frequently pays infrastructure costs in their entirety.  
Commercial services are therefore generally provided by private operators. The withdrawal 
of the Port Authorities from operation, particularly at terminals, is a general feature of 
European ports. Thus, some port reforms have put into law this withdrawal and the 
refocusing of the activities of the port authorities towards regulation, management and 
promotion (in France and Italy). There has therefore been a general move among European 
ports towards the landlord port model, i.e. a structure with public infrastructure, private 
superstructure, private market services and public non-market services. While the general 
changes involve a move towards the landlord port model, when we look in detail at port 
functions and organizations the boundaries are frequently less clear. Many ports are still in 
an in-between state where the landlord port model dominates but some features of the tool 
port remain. A number of superstructures can thus remain in public ownership and be leased 
to private operating companies.  
 
The most striking feature to emerge from our analysis of national situations is the persistence 
of a hybrid model which combines aspects of the market-based landlord port model with 
aspects of the more classical tool port model. In a common normative framework (the public-
private divide which is itself founded on an operation-regulation divide provides the norm for 
modern port reforms) and in a common political framework (the European Union), different 
decisions are made for different areas of activity. With regard to port market services, most 
ports adhere to the general philosophy of the European Commission with regard to transport 
policy so these services have been liberalized by implementing varied systems of concession 
and delegation. However, in terms of the real autonomy of the port authorities, that is to say 
their ability to plan, regulate and finance port projects, the national situations exhibit much 
greater contrasts. It is moreover difficult to perceive these differences. Management 
autonomy, financial autonomy, pricing autonomy and commercial autonomy have very 
different meanings in the administrative systems of the different countries. In addition, the 
academic world has so far paid little attention to the issue of autonomy. Nevertheless, from a 
general perspective, the national situations are characterized by variable degrees of 
autonomy that are easily identified and that range from the highest level of autonomy 
(Belgium) to the highest level of national control (Spain). Italian and Spanish ports have 
budgetary and pricing autonomy but are subject to a national process of bargaining for the 
distribution of what are known as extraordinary resources. In contrast, the autonomy of the 
ports of northern Europe extends considerably beyond the management of day-to-day 
affairs. Here too, these degrees of autonomy express complexity in the public sector which is 
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The case of Canadian ports provides an interesting contrast which is based on a somewhat 
different public model. Marie Brooks’ research has to a large extent elucidated this 
governance model, in particular the devolution and marketing models applied in the 
Canadian system (Brooks M, 2007). In terms of the role played by the different tiers of 
government and the nature of institutional organization, we have also compared the situation 
concerning port decentralization and devolution in France and Canada. This work has been 
supplemented by some more recent surveys on the Canada Port Authorities
4 that have 
revealed the mode of organization of the tiers of government involved in port management.  
The changes that have occurred in Canadian port policy in the last 15 years testify to a major 
repositioning of the tiers of government. In the early 1990s, the federal government was 
                                                 
4 This work was started in the framework of an agreement between the Quebec Department of Transport in 
Canada and the National Institute for Transport and Safety Research (INRETS) in France (Debrie et al., 2007). It 
has recently been added to during a spell as visiting professor at the Université de Montréal (Geography 
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confronted by large financial deficits. In 1994, the government issued a budget which 
amongst other things, reduced expenditure in the transport industry. A consequence of this 
was the 1995 National Marine Policy (Act C44). Although this act was not approved until 
1998 as Act C9 (Canada Marine Act), the implementation of the National Marine Policy in 
fact started at the earlier date. The goal of this policy was to reduce federal expenditure and 
rationalize the port and maritime system. It governed the development of all ports apart from 
private ports. This change in the status of ports, which is one of many aspects of the Marine 
Act
5, is explained by the rechanneling of federal expenditure. This reclassified Canada 
Transport’ ports into three operational categories: financially autonomous ports with 
diversified traffic that could become one of the Canada Port Authorities (CPAs); regional and 
local ports to be run by new regional or local authorities; and ports that were defined as 
“remote ports” which provided the only means of access to some localities and which could 
continue to be operated by Canada Transport
 6.  
 
Prior to the 1995-1998 reforms, in spite of the fact that reporting and port management were 
occasionally transferred to the local level, the Canadian model corresponded to the classical 
pattern whereby ports answered to central or federal governments. The Canada Ports 
Corporation managed ports either directly (7 so-called “divisional” ports) or through local 
companies that were under federal control (7 local port companies). 9 Harbour Commissions 
existed in addition to these 14 ports. While remaining under federal jurisdiction, they had 
greater autonomy, but with a considerable municipality presence on their boards of directors. 
These 23 ports represented the first level of the port hierarchy and after the reform mostly 
became Canada Port Authorities (CPAs). Canada Transport – The Canadian Ministry of 
Transport - also directly managed 549 ports or port sites prior to the reform. These sites are 
currently subject to a handover process which aims to deproclaim or transfer them to 
regional or local public or private authorities. Included among these ports are 32 entirely 
private ports which are not under federal jurisdiction except for environmental regulations. 
These ports are therefore not affected by the reform. The 1998 Marine Act is therefore based 
on three categories of ports. The  first category is the 26 remote ports, which are under 
federal control and managed by the regional departments of Canada Transport. The second 
category is the 549 regional or local ports listed under the Marine Act which have been joined 
by about 30 sites that were identified after the original inventory. By 31 May 2008, 472 ports 
that came under the port divestiture programme had been divested, demolished, closed or 
removed from public ownership
7. The third category is the Canada Port Authorities (CPAs), 
of which, following the merger of the 3 ports in the Vancouver region there are now 19. If we 
consider Canadian ports as a whole, the variety of public involvement is clearly considerable, 
taking in all tiers of government from the federal level to the municipal level. The port reforms 
have thus set in motion a comprehensive process of devolution that saw a transfer from 
central government to varied forms of port organization (Brooks, 2004). In fact, the 
                                                 
5 The 1998 Marine Act dealt with all the components of the port and maritime system, not only ports but also 
pilots, coast guards and management of the Saint Laurent. 
6 Except in the case of ports where the local players show interest in acquiring these port tools 
7 129 sites were thus transferred to local interests. They take a large variety of forms, public-public, private-public 
or private-private. 211 sites have been deproclaimed. A smaller number of ports have been transferred to the 
provinces (40) or to other federal ministries (66). The divestiture process, which was planned between 1995 and 
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institutional geography for local or regional ports resulting from this devolution process 
presents all the possible combinations of public involvement (as well as public-private 
involvement). 
In this general structure, the Canada Port Authorities are deemed to form the national 
strategic network of ports and can therefore be compared to the major European ports we 
have discussed earlier. To be eligible for CPA status, ports must satisfy criteria that relate to 
financial autonomy, diversity of traffic, intermodal connections and be of strategic importance 
for Canada’s trade. The CPAs must be autonomous and able to finance their activities from 
the three types of income they generate: the leasing of land, commissions on goods and 
charges on vessels. It should be noted that the original law laid down that ports were not 
eligible for federal finance other than general subsidies or in the event of an emergency. The 
question of access to federal funds has been the subject of much debate that has led to the 
recent reform of the Law which we shall consider later. The difference with European port 
models is therefore significant and worth highlighting: even though they are governed by 
federal legislation that reformed all ports and maritime services, the size of the ports seems 
to be the decisive factor in deciding their modes of organization. The national legal definition 
of a CPA is not therefore based on a framework that imposes a distribution of functions or an 
organizational model but rather on the basis of financial and commercial criteria It was the 
port’s self-financing capacity that enabled it to apply for Canada Port Authority status and it is 
still this autonomy that is monitored by the federal government which does not lay down rules 
that fix the allocation of public and private roles for market and nonmarket services
8. The 
CPAs can thus in certain cases become involved in activities that are related to dispatching, 
navigation and the transport of passengers and goods. When they are engaged in such 
activities, like when they take up loans, the CPAs are not agents of the Canadian 
government. The infrastructure-superstructure division is therefore not as apparent in 
Canada as in Europe and depends directly on the economic importance and the size of the 
port in question. While the major ports (Vancouver, Montreal, Halifax…) apply the classical 
landlord port model, the smaller ports (Trois Rivières, Toronto…) still have a large number of 
publicly-owned facilities which allows them to compensate for the lack of private investment. 
The “marketing” model adopted by the Canadian federal authorities with the aim of reducing 
federal expenditure provides a different way of considering ports which remain in public 
ownership while retaining complete financial and commercial autonomy and a degree of 
freedom regarding their mode of operational organization.  
 
                                                 
8 With regard to federal surveillance, in addition to the federal government's power to appoint members to the 
boards of directors, the CPAs are obliged to publish annual accounts and develop a strategic plan. In the event of 
a problem in the accounts, the federal minister can demand an in-depth financial investigation. Federal 
surveillance was above all decisive at the time the CPAs were set up when the federal government defined the 
port’s freedom of action in the official document the set up the port authority. This federal document, known as a 
“letter patent”, is issued to each port separately and defines its obligations, responsibilities, scope of activity, 
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Figure 2: devolution process: a public repositioning Canadian ports 
 
 
Without undermining the commercial model, recent amendments to the Canada Marine Act 
with regard to public financing brings another factor into the current European debate. While 
marketing was very successful in reducing federal expenditure during the 1990s, thereby 
helping to reduce public debt, it today raises the issue of how the Port Authorities can obtain 
finance in an environment that has changed profoundly in the last ten years, thus since the 
creation of the CPAs. The events of 11 September 2001 have had an impact on regulatory 
constraints and their associated costs and together with growing environmental concerns 
have completely altered the general context within which Canadian ports operate. The recent 
reform the Marine Act which lays down the rules that apply to ports takes account of this 
modification and now allows ports to access federal funds for only three purposes – 
infrastructure, sustainability and security – thereby creating a public investment charter that 
outlines the major directions that port management in Canada will take in the future and 
federal government’s contribution to these investments, in view of the fact that federal plans 
involve all the inland links that are required to serve ports. 
For this change in the Marine Act is part of a more comprehensive strategy that is built 
around Canada’s “National Policy Framework for Strategic Gateways and Trade Corridors”9. 
The aim of this policy framework, which was announced in 2007, is to propose an integrated 
intermodal policy for upgrading Canadian Gateway ports by targeting federal investment, 
introducing coherent planning, and combining different sources of public and private 
finance10. But it is important to note that these investments – which are targeted at major 
                                                 
 
9 So far, one such initiative (the "Asia-Pacific Gateway and Corridor Initiative") has made it possible to direct 
investment towards the west of Canada, particularly around the Vancouver region, and to combine different 
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corridors and therefore only a small number of ports – do not directly involve investment in 
ports but improvements in their continental services. The changes in the Marine Act remain 
within this policy framework which governs federal investment and regulatory changes. The 
transition from a policy aimed at ports to one aimed at corridors mirrors many tendencies that 
have been identified in European port policies and seems to presage a new approach to port 
organization modes by strengthening the on-going process by which the public authorities, 
the port authorities in particular, are refocusing their activities on providing an interface 




3. THE INSTITUTIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF PORTS: MOVING 
BEYOND TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SECTOR ROLES  
 
These remarks about the position and role of the various tiers of government in major 
European ports and in Canadian ports do not, obviously, reveal the variety and the 
interactions between them. They nevertheless allow us to identify some features of the 
institutional geography of ports. The first thing to emphasize about this is its complexity. All 
political levels are present, in various combinations in European and Canadian ports, from 
the legislator who decides on the legal status of the ports (Central Government) to the port 
supervisory authority (National, Regional, Municipal, joint), the port authority (Public 
Institution, Autonomous Company, Commercial Company) to local government. And such 
variation is also present in all the areas where the public sector is present: the control, status, 
design and financing of ports. the “spatial-jurisdictional scales”, to use a term coined by 
Wang and Olivier, are of such complexity that they cannot be represented as a single 
homogeneous public entity. We can add that the most significant difference between the port 
models as regards tiers of government lies in the role given to the municipal level in port 
organization. In some major ports the municipal level is thus the principal supervisory 
authority that manages the port authority, in others the local level has virtually no presence 
on the boards of directors or the supervisory boards. Thus, what emerges from our 
comparison between different national situations is the large diversity in the relationship 
between the city and the port with regard to governance. Also, in this context of institutional 
geography, it is important to bear in mind that there is no association between the size of 
ports and their type of supervisory authority. 
 
The next thing to highlight is whether or not the institutional geography is imposed. In the 
process of devolution, both the new public-private division and the distribution of roles 
between the different levels of government are either stated in a law which sets up a rigid 
framework that sometimes goes as far as to fix the operational organization of the ports or, 
on the contrary, constructed progressively by each port in the context of a process of 
                                                                                                                                                          
known as the “Ontario-Quebec Continental Gateway and Trade Corridor” is currently being discussed at federal 
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bargaining between the different levels of government. In addition, these imposed 
frameworks or bargaining processes are governed by differing rules. Some decisions are 
thus based on purely political considerations (reforming the administrative system, 
decentralization, subsidiarity), and others on financial and economic considerations (financial 
autonomy). With regard to the imposed frameworks, the reform decisions have taken little 
account of the economic profiles and sizes of the ports and have been applied in a uniform 
manner to ports which may be of very different sizes. This last comment echoes the 
conclusions of recent research that has shown that port governance decisions are not really 
based on a genuine measure of effectiveness or, more generally, port profiles and 
performance (Brooks & Pallis, 2008). 
 
The third and final component of this institutional geography results from the need for links 
between the different tiers of government that constitute the organization of the port. 
Devolution has had a clear geographical impact in that it makes it necessary to create 
instruments that link the domains of responsibility of each tier of government. Co-operation 
between the different tiers of government is therefore required in order to manage the 
activities of the port which obviously go beyond their respective domains of responsibility. 
The recent shift in port policy towards the concept of corridors is one example of this. Similar 
advance port or corridor initiatives are under way in most European countries that show the 
importance of ensuring the interface between each tier that is affected by devolution which 
requires a new form of “spatial” governance. The interface function, which is a consequence 
of devolution, thus becomes an important goal for public action, particularly for the port 
authorities that find themselves at the centre of the complex institutional system that 
characterizes port management. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: WHAT ROLE FOR THE PORT AUTHORITIES IN 
THIS GEOGRAPHY 
Ultimately, the issue that is raised is the role of the port authority in this changing institutional 
environment in which the separation between operation and regulation defines new roles for 
both the public sector (legislation / regulation) and the private sector (operation). The port 
authority is in a position between the two and in most case has to reorganize its activities. In 
the case of the dominant landlord model, the port authorities tend to refocus their activities 
onto coordinating the port’s various activities, planning and anticipating demand, land 
management and monitoring port efficiency. Recent developments are also tending to give 
the port authorities a more important role in environmental management which is in the 
process of becoming an indispensable part of port planning and development projects. In a 
recent paper (2003), Comtois and Slack have identified this change in the role of the port 
authorities and described three functions in the port authority’s new governance agenda: 
“land management”, which fulfils the classical planning function, the new priority of 
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to perform the interface role we have mentioned in the context of the modified links between 
the different tiers of government and the operators.  
Another aspect of this refocusing of the port authority’s role, which has received less 
attention in institutional and scientific research, appears to be gradually assuming greater 
importance. This is the role of the port authority in coordinating port and inland services. 
Issues relating to partnerships with inland structures, the creation of what are known as 
advanced ports, the participation of the port authorities in services by rail or inland 
waterways, and more generally involvement in improving port corridors is gradually emerging 
as a new function which is frequently associated with the policy objective of sustainability. 
This opens up the question of the involvement of the port authorities in intermodal services. 
As the authorities gradually withdraw from operational activities within their port, they play a 
greater part in operational activities outside it. It is nevertheless still the case that in general 
the role of ports in service strategies is mainly to coordinate operational and institutional 
actors rather than to operate inland intermodal services. Ultimately, what we observe is the 
port authorities becoming involved in the administration and management of port 
infrastructure (a role which reflects the fact that this infrastructure is in public ownership), and 
the coordination and surveillance of the operators present and, last, playing a greater role in 
linking the different actors and levels involved in inland services.  
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